[NetBehaviour] The inadequate, a philosophical testament, part 1.1

Alan Sondheim sondheim at panix.com
Tue Jun 11 06:46:52 CEST 2019

The inadequate, a philosophical testament, part 1.1


In 1978, I programmed with a TI59 calculator, later with a Terak
minicomputer. I produced a number of pieces gathered together in
a publication, Syntactical and Semantic Programming. This was an
extension of material I was writing on the elimination of entities
and the concept of a procedural semiotics. The heart of this is as
follows (with commentary, 2019) -


An event may be defined as the union of its k-ply intersections of
its set of descriptions. Consider a set of descriptions that one
might apply to an otherwise undefined event E. These descriptions
have a number of elements which overlap to any particular depth; a
depth of 1 indicates that every description is given equal value,
and a depth of N (number of descriptions) applies to taking only
what all of them have in common in terms of attributes. Depth can
be assigned to any number n, from 1 to N. The union of depths can
considered in various ways and weights. There are no events to be
considered beyond the set of descriptions; priority is given to
epistemology, not a process ontology. There are no hard and fast
rules, no absolute categories, and every ontology in the long run
is inadequate, momentary.


An entity may be defined as the union of its k-ply intersections
of its list of attributes. See above.


"Intersection" above is defined by a probabilistic matching
algorithm; "union" is concatenation or summation. The operations
can be interpreted any way one wants; the main point is the
elimination of ontology - which is interpretable as necessarily
inadequate. So one moves among digital epistemologies, hoping for
the best - not among fundamental ontologies of a real - which is
ultimately unknowable (for example multiverses, Planck limits
etc.) - everything exists only within a phenomenology of approach
- not within well-defined domains of the real. The more one moves
from physics towards the social, organic, and so forth, the more
one is at a loss, insofar as categories are concerned.

(Note that any description might be considered in terms of a core
and outliers; the former is an equivalence subset in relation to
other descriptions, and the outliers are embedded or related
attributes "along for the ride." Give two descriptions, _abcde_
and _acdfh_, the core would be _acd_ and the outliers would be
_befh_. The cores appear to define an event or entity; the
outliers, to the extent they might be considered "sticky," then
may or may not add additional attributes or informaton. This is
sloppy set theory to be sure.)


Further, within any inadequate domain (collocation of events
and/or entities), independent transformations exist; all domains
are problematic, fuzzy.


An interesting program of procedural ontology may be given in two

1 = Pause RST */in which 1 is displayed/*
RST */in which nothing is displayed/*

Both are examples of REWRITE, a process which produces the visible
or invisible simulacrum of an entity which itself is in-process,
depending on the operating system, speed, energy feeding into the
machine, entropy wear-and-tear, and so forth. */RST is return but
always already to something slightly different./*


Then there's this: The fine-structure of transformations is
interpreted in relation to catastrophe and framework theory,
anomaly ("over the edge") represented by an increase or decrease
of energy leading to a jump in the fold or cusp or other
catastrophes etc. Within the butterfly catastrophe, "elsewhere"
can be considered as the central sheet. Within the notion of "the
fragility of good things," stability is temporary at best: it
takes maintenance and energy to remain temporarily within a given
domain as an entity, independent or otherwise. And energy
corrodes, is corroded, is corrosive.


An "object" is a resistance.


Every "object" _has_ a collocation of thresholds.
Every "object" _is_ a collocation of thresholds.
Are these equivalent? Does possession apply? Does the copula?


Every "object" is inadequate; every "description" is inadequate;
every set of descriptions is inadequate; the world is ragged,
noisy, catastrophic, even fractal within limits.


Of course it is just as easy to say that catastrophe and frame
theories might both be deprecated, that we're more certain than
ever of the categoricity of the world, that anomalies are only the
result, for example, of overpopulation, ignorance of the physics
beyond ascertainable energy regimes and the ultimate fine-
structure of the world, that local entities may well be perfectly
defined, once the tools and taxonomies are developed, etc.  So
there are matters of faith and faithlessness on all sides. (It may
come down to preferences, and I prefer open and problematic worlds
and worldings; I also prefer ontological collapses, for example as
far as deities are concerned. And finally, by preference or
tendency, I see continuous mayhem and environmental degradation in
the world we live in - not only are there no easy solutions, but
there are no solutions at all (however one might define
"solutions"), and things will settle, sometime or other in the
near and far future, into currently unrecognizable states of chaos
and environmental diminution. This is not to say, not to resist -
resistance is necessary, as far as possible, in spite of the
tragedy we're just beginning to recognize.)


already errors report:
In 1978, I programmed with a TI59 calculator, later with a Terak
extension of material I was writing on the elimination of entities
ultimately unknowable (for example multiverses, Planck limits
anomaly ("over the edge") represented by an increasing of energy


See http://www.alansondheim.org/inadequate.txt for full text.

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